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Abstract
College football and men’s basketball are the largest revenue generators in college
athletics. Studies funded by athletic boosters tout the economic benefits of a college athletic
program as an incentive for host cities to construct new stadiums or arenas at considerable public
expense. Our analysis of the economic impact of home football and men’s basketball games on
Tallahassee (home of Florida State University) and Gainesville (home of the University of
Florida) between 1980 to early-2007 fails to support these claims. Men’s basketball games at
these universities have no statistically significant impact on taxable sales, while football yields a
modest gain of $2 to $3 million per home game. While this positive finding is one of the first in
the academic literature of the impact of sports, these gains pale in comparison to the figures in
many of the studies funded by athletic boosters. 
JEL Classification Codes: L83, O18, R53
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 1. Introduction 
 Sports boosters often claim that sports teams, facilities, and events inject large sums of 
money into the cities lucky enough to host them. Promoters envision hoards of wealthy sports 
fans descending on a city’s hotels, restaurants, and businesses, and showering them with fistfuls 
of dollars. For example, the National Football League (NFL) typically claims an economic 
impact from the Super Bowl of around $400 million (National Football League, 1999) and Major 
League Baseball (MLB) attaches a $75 million benefit to the All-Star Game (Selig, Harrington, 
and Healey 1999) and up to $250 million for the World Series (Ackman 2000). College sports 
generate equally eye-popping numbers. The estimated effect of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) Men’s Basketball Final Four ranges from $30 million to $110 million 
(Mensheha 1998; Anderson 2001) and major football bowl games and their surrounding 
activities generate figures up to $400 million in benefits (Fiesta Bowl, 2007; Tournament of 
Roses, 2007). 
 Even regular season games prompt claims of huge benefits. For example, the Oregon 
Baseball Campaign, a group dedicated to bringing MLB to Portland, reported that “a MLB team 
and ballpark would generate between $170 and $300 million annually in gross expenditures to 
the state of Oregon” (Oregon Baseball Campaign 2002) while a similar analysis completed for 
the Virginia Baseball Authority stated that a “a major league baseball franchise and stadium in 
northern Virginia would pump more that $8.6 billion into the economy over 30 years,” or $287 
million annually. Of course, professional leagues are not the only ones providing rosy economic 
impact numbers. The University of Nebraska, for example, estimated that during the 2004-05 
school year, its football program alone generated $87.1 million in output, $31.2 million in 
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 worker income, and 2,130 jobs in the Lincoln area. Estimated statewide economic impact of 
University of Nebraska athletics ranged from $48 to $155 million (Thompson, 2005). 
 Of course, colleges, leagues, team owners, and event organizers have a strong incentive 
to provide economic impact numbers that are as large as possible in order to justify heavy public 
subsidies. In professional leagues, the prospect of large economic benefits is highlighted to 
minimize the team or league’s required contribution to the funding of a new stadium or arena. 
For universities, large economic impact estimates are used to justify public expenditures on 
athletic programs or improvements to playing facilities. In addition, the majority of the largest 
college football and college basketball programs are public institutions. In 2009, for example, the 
University of Minnesota will open a new $288 million stadium, 55% of which was paid for with 
state funds (although the precise line between what constitutes state and university funds is 
admittedly unclear when dealing with a public university).  
This paper estimates the economic impact of home football and men’s basketball games 
for two small to mid-sized metropolitan areas that house large public institutions: Gainesville 
(University of Florida) and Tallahassee (Florida State University). Football and men’s basketball 
are the largest revenue generators in college athletics, and both schools have popular and 
successful programs. For example, in the 2006-07 school year the University of Florida attracted 
633 thousand football fans and 213 thousand fans in men’s basketball and won national 
championships in both sports. The results of this paper suggest that men’s basketball games have 
no identifiable impact on a city’s economy while college football games have a measurable but 
small positive impact on real economic variables in host cities. 
 
2. Criticisms of ex ante and ex post studies 
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 Independent studies of the economic impact of spectator sports have cast doubt on the 
promises of significant financial gains accruing to host cities. A typical ex ante economic impact 
study used by league and event promoters estimates the number of visitors an event or team is 
expected to draw, the number of days each spectator is expected to stay in the city, and the 
amount each visitor will spend each day. Combining these figures, an estimate of the “direct 
economic impact” is obtained. This direct impact is then subjected to a multiplier to account for 
the initial round of spending recirculating through the economy, and this additional spending is 
known as “indirect economic impact.” The sum of the direct and indirect impact is the total 
economic impact. 
While such an estimation method is relatively straight-forward, numerous academic 
articles such as Crompton (1995) and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), to name just two, 
have pointed out the shortcomings of such ex ante studies. In summary, the general criticism of 
impact studies is that while they may do a credible job in determining the economic activity that 
occurs as a result of a sports team or mega-event, they rarely account for economic activity that 
is displaced due to sporting events. In other words, economic impact studies typically measure 
gross economic activity rather than net activity and therefore bias upward the true impact of an 
event on the local economy.   
Numerous studies have looked back at the actual performance of economies that have 
had professional franchises, built new playing facilities, and hosted mega-events and have 
compared the observed economic performance of host cities to that predicted in ex ante studies. 
These ex post analyses of stadiums and franchises, including Rosentraub (1994), Baade (1996), 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), Coates and Humphreys (1999; 2003), and Baade, Baumann, 
Matheson (2008) among others, generally find little or no economic benefits from professional 
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 sports teams or new playing facilities. Studies of mega-events, such as Porter (1999), Baade and 
Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), Coates and Humphreys (2002), Coates (2006), Coates and 
Depken (2006), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), similarly uncover little relationship 
between hosting major sporting events and real economic variables such as employment, 
personal income, personal income per capita, and taxable sales. 
A valid criticism, however, of the existing body of work regarding the ex post economic 
impact of sports is that these studies are trying to uncover the proverbial needle in a haystack. 
For example, even if a MLB franchise or a Super Bowl does result in a $300 million boost to the 
host city, this is less than 0.1 percent of the annual personal income of a large metropolitan area 
like Los Angeles. Any income gains as a result of a new franchise or a big game would almost 
certainly be lost within the normal fluctuations in the region’s economy. In the study of mega-
events, this problem is further compounded due to the time frames involved. Even if the effects 
of a mega-event are large in the time period immediately surrounding the event, this impact is 
likely to be obscured in the annual data upon which many studies, including Coates and 
Humphreys (1999; 2002) and Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), rely. 
In this paper, the football and basketball programs of the University of Florida (U-FL) 
and Florida State University (FSU) are examined using Florida taxable sales data. Taxable sales 
data are used because the state of Florida provides these data monthly, which increases the 
ability to isolate the economic effects of the sports. U-FL and FSU are chosen because they have 
popular and successful programs (in football at the very least) and are located in smaller cities. 
Both teams average home football crowds in excess of 80,000 fans per game, a figure that 
exceeds the average attendance of nearly every team in the NFL, yet both universities reside in 
relatively small metropolitan areas. The populations of the Gainesville (U-FL) and Tallahassee 
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 (FSU) metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in 2005 were 240 thousand and 333 thousand, 
respectively, a fraction of the median population of over 2.3 million for MSAs with an NFL 
team. Identifying the economic impact, should it exist, from events of the magnitude of a home 
football game using high frequency, monthly data on these small metropolitan areas, is likely to 
be a much easier task than performing the same job with annual data for a big metropolitan area. 
 
3. The Data and the Models 
The data include over 25 years of monthly sales tax data (December 1979 through March 
2007) for every county in Florida. The Census county compositions of the metropolitan areas are 
used to construct taxable sales for Gainesville and Tallahassee. MSA taxable sales are used in 
lieu of county taxable sales because, as noted previously, it is important to differentiate between 
the gross and net impact of a franchise. If a football game simply causes residents to spend 
money at the stadium rather than elsewhere in the local economy, analysis of only a single 
county may not capture this substitution effect. Examining an entire MSA will account for the 
substitution effect if money is redirected between counties within a single MSA due to sporting 
events. The monthly consumer price index compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is used to 
convert taxable sales data to 2006 dollars.  
 Since monthly taxable sales in Tallahassee and Gainesville can exceed $900 million in 
real terms, even the effects of a potentially major economic event such as a college football or 
men’s basketball game can be obscured by the normal economic fluctuations of these economies. 
Many factors including the local, regional and national business cycle, state and federal 
government policies, monetary policy and inflation, international factors, consumer and business 
confidence, wealth effects, and a host of other ingredients influence taxable sales. This paper 
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 approaches this problem using two specifications of taxable sales. Model 1 analyzes taxable sales 
for each MSA using controls for the number of home football and men’s basketball games, in 
addition to other independent variables to account for general changes in economic conditions. 
Model 2 analyzes taxable sales for each MSA as a share of the rest of the state of Florida, 
henceforth called the taxable sales ratio. This specification filters the noise caused by changes in 
statewide economic conditions that affect both Gainesville and Tallahassee. In each model, 
growth rates are taken using 12-month differentials to account for seasonality, which shortens 
our sample frame to December 1980 through March 2007.  
 Both models use an ARMA(P,Q) model  
tttqtq
Q
=q
ptp
P
1=p
0t zxy   = y     εβγεβ +++Θ+Φ+ −− ∑∑
0
**  
where yt*  is the growth rate in taxable sales (Model 1) or growth rate in the taxable sales ratio 
(Model 2) in time period t, P is the number of lagged values of yt* in the model known as the 
autoregressive (AR) dimension of the model, εt is an error term, Q is the number of lagged values 
of the error term representing the moving average (MA) dimension of the model, xt  is a vector of 
exogenous variables that affect economic activity, and zt is a vector of independent variables 
representing the effect of various sporting events in the MSA. Maximum likelihood 
estimates ,,,,, βγβ ΘΦ qp0    and σ , which is the standard deviation of the white noise error tε .  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests reject the existence of a unit root for 
all four time series. The autoregressive and moving average dimensions of the models are 
determined through trial and error testing. Only the optimal autoregressive and moving average 
structure, as determined by the Akaike Information Criterion, is presented in the results. Within 
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 each MSA, the optimal numbers of AR and MA components are the same for both specifications 
of taxable sales.  
The vector of non-sports controls, xt , is included to isolate the impact of home football 
and men’s basketball games. First, Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Florida in late August 
1992, but the economic effects were felt throughout the state. Second, the events of 9/11 
significantly slowed tourism, which is an integral part of Florida’s economy. Finally, we include 
controls for three months of abnormal Gainesville data: January 1990, April 1990, and 
September 1998. Because the dependent variable in both models is a 12-month growth rate, each 
of these events will affect growth rates in two periods. Therefore, two dummy variables, one for 
the actual time period, another for one year later, are included for each event.  
In Model 1, xt includes two other controls. First, the two-month lag of the national 
unemployment rate is included to account for national trends. Second, the state of Florida 
collected sales tax on services between August 1987 and May 1988, which impacted the gross 
amount of taxable sales. These controls are not statistically significant when included in Model 2 
for either MSA, indicating these events did not disproportionately impact Gainesville or 
Tallahassee relative to the rest of Florida.  
The vector of sports controls, zt , contains the number of home football and men’s 
basketball games in the MSA. Although both sports are always played in the same months, there 
is variation in the number of home games. Table 1 presents the frequencies of each variable. 
College football games are typically played on Saturday, and large programs like U-F and FSU 
usually play one or two more home games than away games. Not surprisingly, the range is 
between zero (off-season) and four, with two as the most common number of in-season home 
games per month. The number of men’s basketball games each month ranges from zero (off-
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 season) to eight. This variable has more variation because basketball games are played 
throughout the week and most teams play between 25 and 30 games each season.  
Table 2 presents the results for Tallahassee under Model 1, which uses the growth rate of 
taxable sales as the dependent variable. The estimate of the effect of home football games is 
positive, but not statistically significant, and the number of men’s basketball games does not 
affect taxable sales. Taxable sales in Tallahassee do not appear to be affected by Hurricane 
Andrew or 9/11, but remain in the model as a comparison to Model 2.  
Table 3 presents the results for Tallahassee under Model 2, where the dependent variable 
is the growth rate of the taxable sales ratio. The effect of home football games is again positive 
but is also statistically significant at five percent, while the number of men’s basketball games 
continues to have no observable effect on taxable sales. In other words, the effect of home 
football games is uncertain using the Tallahassee’s taxable sales but is positive using 
Tallahassee’s taxable sales as a ratio to the rest of Florida. The statistically significant result for 
football in Tallahassee under Model 2 makes this paper among the first ex post studies to find 
evidence of the positive economic benefits of spectator sports. The magnitude of this positive 
benefit is worth of further examination.  
In Table 3 the estimate of the effect of a college football home game is 0.00557. Using 
sample means from fall 2006, this corresponds to about a relative $2.1 million net increase in 
Tallahassee’s taxable sales compared to the rest of the state for each home game. The nature of 
the taxable sales ratio, however, suggests that some of this net gain may be caused by a loss in 
taxable sales elsewhere in Florida since a ratio can increase either by increasing the numerator 
(Tallahassee’s taxable sales) or decreasing the denominator (the taxable sales of the rest of the 
state). Assuming that each home game attracts fans from all over the state, the money spent by 
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 these out-of-town fans in Tallahassee is money that presumably would have spent elsewhere 
within Florida.  In Table 2, the estimated effect of a college football home game is 0.00260 
(although this estimate is not statistically significant). At the sample means, this corresponds to 
about a $1.0 million increase in Tallahassee’s taxable sales for each home game, or roughly half 
of the $2.1 million figure derived from the taxable sales ratio model. While one must be careful 
to attribute too much confidence to an estimate that is not statistically significant, if each home 
football game generates an extra $1.0 million in taxable sales for Tallahassee, in order for the 
data to result in a $2.1 million gain in Tallahassee’s taxable sales ratio, taxable sales in the rest of 
the state must fall by a similar amount. The data appear to show that football games are indeed 
beneficial for the host city of Tallahassee, but this benefit comes at the expense of economic 
activity in the rest of the state, a classic case of the substitution effect.  
Similarly, Table 3 shows positive and statistically significant effects of Hurricane 
Andrew and 9/11 on Tallahassee’s taxable sales ratio. However, it is likely these net gains are 
caused by losses in taxable sales throughout the state. This is supported by the results in Table 2, 
which suggest that of Hurricane Andrew and 9/11 did not have an effect on Tallahassee’s taxable 
sales.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for Gainesville under Model 1 and Model 2, 
respectively. The effect of college football home games is positive in each model, but is not 
statistically significant. In addition, just as in Tallahassee, men’s college basketball games are a 
poor fit in the model. At U-FL and FSU, basketball games typically draw crowds that are one-
fifth to one-tenth the size of those at football games, and the events tend to generate less 
excitement than do the all-day extravaganzas of home football games. It is then, perhaps, no 
surprise that basketball does not generate significant results in either city.  
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 As noted previously, the underlying Gainesville data are noticeably “muddier” than the 
Tallahassee figures due to anomalies in data. The football coefficients are of the expected sign, 
however, and achieve a one-sided p-value of just under 10%. In Table 5 the estimate of the effect 
of a college football home game using the taxable sales ratio is 0.00815. Using sample means 
from fall 2006, this corresponds to about a relative $2.9 million net increase in Gainesville’s 
taxable sales compared to the rest of the state for each home game. In Table 4, the estimated 
effect of a college football home game using taxable sales growth is 0.00853. At the sample 
means, this corresponds to about a $3.0 million increase in Gainesville’s taxable sales for each 
home game. The Gainesville estimates, which are based on coefficients on the very edge of 
statistical significance, do not corroborate the findings of the substitution effect that occurred in 
the Tallahassee data, but do generate dollar impacts of roughly similar magnitudes.  
 
4. Conclusions  
Sports boosters have long held that spectator sports hold the promise of riches for host 
cities. In the past, league and industry-sponsored studies have estimated that mega-events such as 
the Super Bowl and All-Star games increase economic activity by hundreds of millions of dollars 
in host cities. Similar studies claim that new stadiums or franchises, as well as college athletic 
programs, also can have hundreds of millions of dollars of annual local economic impact. Our 
regression analysis of taxable sales in Florida over the period from 1980 to early-2007 fails to 
support these claims. Men’s basketball games at FSU and U-FL were found to have no 
statistically significant impact on taxable sales in Tallahassee and Gainesville, and indeed, the 
coefficient on the variable was even negative in two of the four models.  
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 Football is another story, however. In the two models tested for each city, the coefficient 
on the football variable is positive in all four cases, statistically significant in one case, and 
borderline significant in two others. Each additional home football games increases taxable sales 
in the host city by $2 to $3 million, although we find evidence that the city’s gain may come at 
the expense of economic activity in the rest of the state.  
While this paper is one of the first in the academic literature to find a positive economic 
impact of sports on host communities, the numbers give boosters little to cheer about. If a college 
football game that attracts 80 or 90 thousand fans to a relatively small community only generates 
small identifiable economic gains, there is no reason to place any serious credence in economic 
impact estimates in other sports that can easily range into the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Furthermore, a $2 or $3 million bump in taxable sales per home game does not justify large 
public handouts for sports facilities. The results show that cities would be wise to view with 
caution economic impact estimates provided by sports boosters, who have an obvious incentive 
to inflate these estimates. The loud roars inside the stadium are only quiet blips in the economic 
data. 
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 Table 1: Frequency Table of Sports Variables  
number of home football games at t Tallahassee Gainesville 
  frequency  frequency 
 
 0         230              234 
 1          29         26 
 2          46         36 
 3           9                  19 
                        4            2           1  
                      sum         316       316 
 
 
number of home men’s basketball Tallahassee Gainesville 
                games at t  frequency        frequency 
 
 0         195              201 
 1          20         21 
 2          17         19 
 3          27         19 
 4          25                  29 
 5          25                  18 
 6           7                 7 
                        7            0                 0 
                        8            0                 2 
                      sum         316       316 
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 Table 2: (Sample 1980.12 - 2007.4): Tallahassee Model 1 
Dependent variable: 12 month percent change in Tallahassee’s taxable sales  
Variable coefficient std. err.   z-statistic   
Constant 0.02854** 0.00897 3.18 
two month change in unemployment -0.03597* 0.02092 -1.72 
9/11 impact -0.01391 0.03331 -0.42  
9/11 impact, one year later  -0.02566 0.03135 -0.82 
Services taxed 0.13119** 0.03849 3.41 
Services taxed, one year later -0.06907** 0.02529 -2.73 
Hurricane Andrew -0.00252       0.01864 -0.14 
Hurricane Andrew, one year later 0.00672 0.02128         0.32  
number of home football games 0.00260 0.00293 0.89  
number of home basketball games -0.00202 0.00166 -1.22  
AR(2) 0.74233** 0.04434 16.74 
MA(1) 0.39935** 0.07097 5.63 
MA(2) -0.60067** 0.07098 -8.46 
σ)  0.05264** 0.00284 18.53   
log pseudo-likelihood 480.0977 
Notes: All dollar impact values are in 2006 dollars using the CPI. For each dichotomous variable, 
a second dummy variable is included for the following year because the dependent variable is a 
12 month percent change. The dummy variables for months of unusually large or small data 
(January 1990, April 1990, and September 1998) are excluded for brevity. Finally, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the one percent and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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 Table 3: (Sample 1980.12 - 2007.4): Tallahassee Model 2 
Dependent variable: 12 month percent change in Tallahassee’s share of Florida’s taxable sales  
Variable coefficient std. err.   z-statistic   
Constant -0.00817 0.00620 -1.32 
9/11 impact 0.07188** 0.02444 2.94  
9/11 impact, one year later  -0.09054** 0.02300 -3.94 
Hurricane Andrew 0.09823**       0.02155 4.56 
Hurricane Andrew, one year later -0.03889 0.03030        -1.28 
number of home football games 0.00557** 0.00268 2.08  
number of home basketball games 0.00010 0.00126 0.08 
AR(2) 0.80303** 0.04200 19.12 
MA(1) 0.26421** 0.04650 5.68 
MA(2) -0.73579** 0.04650 -15.82 
σ)  0.04148** 0.00205 20.24  
log pseudo-likelihood 555.6729 
 
Notes: All dollar impact values are in 2006 dollars using the CPI. For each dichotomous variable, 
a second dummy variable is included for the following year because the dependent variable is a 
12 month percent change. The dummy variables for months of unusually large or small data 
(January 1990, April 1990, and September 1998) are excluded for brevity. Finally, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the one percent and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4: (Sample 1980.12 - 2007.4): Gainesville Model 1  
Dependent variable: 12 month percent change in Gainesville’s taxable sales  
Variable coefficient std. err.   z-statistic   
Constant 0.02948** 0.00858 3.44 
two month change in unemployment -0.05353** 0.02048 -2.61 
9/11 impact 0.06125* 0.02606 2.35  
9/11 impact, one year later  -0.07345** 0.02339 -3.14 
Services taxed 0.06034** 0.02265 2.66 
Services taxed, one year later -0.07534** 0.02927 -2.57 
Hurricane Andrew -0.03845       0.02485 -1.55 
Hurricane Andrew, one year later -0.04495 0.08101         -0.55  
number of home football games 0.00853 0.00677 1.26  
number of home basketball games -0.00020 0.00229 -0.09  
AR(1) 0.81403** 0.05970 13.63 
MA(1) -0.55352** 0.08778 -6.31 
σ)  0.06688** 0.00499 13.41   
log pseudo-likelihood 406.1751 
 
Notes: All dollar impact values are in 2006 dollars using the CPI. For each dichotomous variable, 
a second dummy variable is included for the following year because the dependent variable is a 
12 month percent change. The dummy variables for months of unusually large or small data 
(January 1990, April 1990, and September 1998) are excluded for brevity. Finally, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the one percent and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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 Table 5: (Sample 1980.12 - 2007.4): Gainesville Model 2 
Dependent variable: 12 month percent change in Gainesville’s share of Florida’s taxable sales  
Variable coefficient std. err.   z-statistic   
Constant -0.00596 0.00763 -0.78 
9/11 impact 0.15073** 0.02005 7.52  
9/11 impact, one year later  -0.12239** 0.01756 -6.97 
Hurricane Andrew 0.06977**       0.02494 2.80 
Hurricane Andrew, one year later -0.05912 0.06988        -0.85  
number of home football games 0.00815 0.00617 1.32  
number of home basketball games 0.00028 0.00154 0.18 
AR(1) 0.88820** 0.04867 18.25 
MA(1) -0.71287** 0.07218 -9.88 
σ)  0.05710** 0.005533 10.31  
log pseudo-likelihood 456.1566 
 
Notes: All dollar impact values are in 2006 dollars using the CPI. For each dichotomous variable, 
a second dummy variable is included for the following year because the dependent variable is a 
12 month percent change. The dummy variables for months of unusually large or small data 
(January 1990, April 1990, and September 1998) are excluded for brevity. Finally, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the one percent and ten percent levels, respectively. 
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